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agreed with the plaintiff that no diversity should be required.
It has been suggested that an acceptance of the minority posi-
tion would be desirous "because there is little logic in a system
of law which affords a seaman suing on a maritime cause of action
a federal jury trial if there happens to be diversity of citizenship
but which denies him a jury in the same federal court if there is
no diversity."4 If this rationale were adopted, it would apply to
passenger claimants as well as seamen and be an additional induce-
ment to seeking maritime jurisdiction.41
The advantages, disadvantages, and problems evidenced in the
previous discussion must be considered in the light of possible de-
parture of the Warsaw Convention from the transoceanic flight
scene in the United States.4" If these rules disappear, admiralty is
a logical replacement.
Some aspects of admiralty, like the tonnage provision,43 would
be difficult to employ. It is submitted that a selective process would
be in order, a new set of rules governing transoceanic air travel
using the basic concepts of admiralty as a foundation with liberal
provision for adjustment to the rapid developments that character-
ize modem aviation.
WILLIAm H. FAULK, JR.
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punisbment-
Chronic Alcoholism
In Driver v. Hinnant' defendant had been found guilty and sen-
tenced' to imprisonment for two years for violation of a North
Carolina statute making it a misdemeanor for "any person ... [to]
be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any
public place or meeting . . ... - Defendant had been convicted of
, 0 BAER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 69.
"The problem does not arise if the state forum is chosen. But if contrib-
utory negligence is an issue, it may nullify any prospective advantage of
jury trial. In Notarian, contributory negligence was not an issue but this
writer is informed that a three- or four-year backlog in the Pennsylvania
courts played a significant role in the decision to sue in admiralty. Letter
from plaintiff's attorney to the writer, Jan. 31, 1966.
"2 See text accompanying note- 21 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 22 supra.
'Driver v. Hinnant, 34 U.S.L. Week 2422 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 1966).
2Driver v. Hirmant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953).
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the same offense over 200 times previously and had spent two-thirds
of his life "on the roads" for drinking.4 He appealed to the North
Carolina Supreme Court contending that his conviction under this
statute was cruel and unusual punishment.5 In a per curiam opinion
the court affirmed the conviction saying that the sentences were
authorized by the statute and that the prison authorities provided
adequate medical treatment for prisoners during their confinement."
The defendant then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina.7 The district court denied the writ, holding that the appli-
cation of the statute to the defendant does not subject him to cruel
and unusual punishment.8 On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the conviction violated the
eighth amendment to the Constitution as being a cruel and unusual
punishment.'
The eighth amendment has been held applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 0 It
has been held to prohibit punishment disproportionate to the offense
for which it was imposed" and denationalization for wartime de-
sertion.12 In Robinson v. California"3 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that drug addiction was an illness and a statute
punishing such an illness inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in
' Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
'State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
aIbid.
' Driver v. Hinant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
BId. at 101.
'34 U.S.L. Week 2422 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 1966).
" In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462-63 (1947),
the Supreme Court assumed without deciding the issue that a violation of
the eighth amendment by a state would violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962),
the Court specifically decided that the eighth amendment applied to the states
through the due process clause.
" Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), where the defendant
made false entries in public records and was sentenced to imprisonment
attended by punishment that included the carrying of chains, deprivation
of civil rights during imprisonment, and thereafter perpetual disqualifica-
tion from holding office.
12 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
19370 U.S. 660 (1962). For cases in which the Supreme Court has
held that the particular punishment did not violate the eighth amendment
see, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), where
the court denied petitioner's contention that it was cruel and unusual punish-
ment for Louisiana to electrocute him after a prior abortive attempt. Accord,
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (electrocution).
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violation of the fourteenth amendment.14 In Driver, the court said
that chronic alcoholism is a disease and punishment by criminal
prosecution for those acts on the part of a chronic alcoholic " 'which
are compulsive as symptomatic of the disease'" is a cruel and un-
usual punishment.' Thus the defendant could not be convicted
under a public drunkenness statute, since the symptoms of chronic
alcoholism may appear as a disorder of behavior, and this " 'obvious-
ly... includes appearances in public, as here, unwilled and ungov-
ernable by the victim.' -'s
Although the court did limit its decision to the "'excusal of the
chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution . . .'" for "'those acts
on his part which are compulsive as symptomatic of the disease,' ,,
the case raises numerous questions with respect to its immediate
application to the public drunkenness statute and its potential appli-
cation to other areas of the law. Perhaps the most immediate prob-
lem inherent in the decision is the determination of the symptoms
of chronic alcoholism. It would seem to be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the medical profession, much less the courts,
to make a definitive determination of those acts which are sympto-
matic of the disease.' 8 Consequently, whether or not an act of a
chronic alcoholic is a symptom of his illness will hinge upon the
facts of each case; thus the general limitation imposed by the Fourth
Circuit would seem to be too vague for application in subsequent
cases.
Does it follow from the Driver decision that a chronic alcoholic
cannot be convicted for a crime, other than public drunkenness,
committed while he is intoxicated? The answer to this question
would seem to turn on the question of whether or not a chronic
alcoholic could be classified as insane or whether his drinking had
destroyed his will so that his act was involuntary. Professor Paulsen
has said: "At present psychiatry does not seem to recognize a psy-
chosis which gives rise to an uncontrollable urge to drink although
heavy drinking may be a symptom of a psychosis having other
1 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
1 34 U.S.L. Week at 2422.
26 Ibid.
Ibid.
18 Comment by Dr. John Ewing, A Panel on Alcoholism and the Law, at
the University of North Carolina School of Law, February 10, 1966.
[Vol. 44
1966] PUNISHMENT FOR ALCOHOLISM 821
related characteristics of disordered behavior and psychic life."' 9
Thus it would seem that chronic alcoholism itself would not be a
defense to a crime other than a violation of a public drunkenness
statute, but that insanity caused by chronic alcoholism would be a
defense.2" In essence, only insanity would be a defense to the crime
and alcoholism would be only a symptom to be admitted into evi-
dence on the question of insanity.
The only other means by which a chronic alcoholic could be
exculpated for a crime committed while he was intoxicated would
be to say that the intoxication destroyed his will.2 ' The Fourth
Circuit said: "'This conclusion does not contravene the familiar
thesis that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime. The
chronic alcoholic has not drunk voluntarily, although undoubtedly
he did so originally. His excess now derives from disease.' "22 The
normal rule is that voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime23
but that involuntary intoxication may exculpate the accused.2" At
first glance, by saying that the intoxication of the chronic alcoholic
is involuntary, the Fourth Circuit seems to imply that a chronic
alcoholic would be exculpated for any crime he committed while
intoxicated. But it is possible that the court considers the intoxica-
tion of a chronic alcoholic involuntary only in connection with the
violation of a public drunkenness statute. The statute under which
Joe Driver was convicted requires no mens rea25 and voluntary in-
toxication would be no defense to the conviction.26 But, by saying
that the defendant's intoxication was involuntary, the court pro-
1" Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 20.
See generally VI JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
THE PROBLEM OF INTOXICATION (1961).
2 Generally, legal insanity brought on by intoxication is a complete de-
fense to a crime. E.g., People v. Herrin, 295 Ill. App. 590, 15 N.E.2d 598
(1938); State v. Painter, 135 W. Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950).
" Involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to a crime if it destroys
the criminal capacity of the defendant's mind. E.g., Choate v. State, 19
Okl. Crim. 169, 197 Pac. 1060 (1921). See generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 781, 787 (1957).
22 34 U.S.L. Week at 2422.
" See generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 787 (1957).
2" See note 21 supra.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953). This type of statute provides that
the doing of certain acts is a crime and no mens rea is required.
2 For cases illustrating that voluntary intoxication is no defense to a
crime that requires no general mens rea see, e.g., People v. Cochran, 313
Ill. 508, 145 N.E. 207 (1924) (homicide); Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71,
156 S.W.2d 385 (1941) (rape).
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vides the defendant with a defense since involuntary intoxication
completely exculpates a defendant from a crime whether or not mens
rea is required. It is doubtful that the court would say that a
chronic alcoholic's intoxication was involuntary if he committed
any crime other than violation of a public drunkenness statute,
since that would mean that no chronic alcoholic could be convicted
for any crime committed while he was intoxicated. 8 A conclusion
such as this would seem to violate the principle purpose of incarcera-
tion-protection of the public from the criminal.2
Although it was conceded in this case that Joe Driver was a
chronic alcoholic,"0 the question arises how the court should deter-
mine who is and who is not a chronic alcoholic. The Fourth Circuit
said, " '[W] hen on arraignment the accused's helplessness comes to
light ... [the Constitution intercedes so that] . . . no criminal con-
viction may follow.' ",' But the court provides no guidance regard-
ing how the determination should be made if it does not appear at
arraignment that the defendant is a chronic alcoholic. One plausible
method of deciding this issue could be found in the District of
Columbia Code where Congress has provided that in any criminal
case in which the evidence indicates that the defendant is a chronic
alcoholic, the judge may suspend the proceedings so that the person
can be confined in a rehabilitation center and treated."2 If the ex-
perts at the rehabilitation center should determine that the accused
is actually a chronic alcoholic, it would seem that the court would
be required to accept this evidence, and no conviction for public
drunkenness could follow.33 Perhaps a better means by which to
determine whether a defendant is a chronic alcoholic would be to
place the burden of proof on the defendant, thereby retaining an
"' See note 21 supra.28 Ibid.
"0 Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285, 291 (Oyer & Terminer
Ct. 1930)." Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 97 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
8134 U.S.L. Week at 2422.
2 Under this statute, the judge may suspend the proceedings and order
a hearing to be held to determine whether the defendant is a chronic
alcoholic. If the judge or jury should find that the defendant is a chronic
alcoholic, he can then be committed to a clinic for diagnosis and treatment
for ninety days. After the ninety-day period has expired, the director of
the clinic can recommend that the defendant be set free conditionally and
under supervision, or be placed in an institution for treatment as a chronic
alcoholic, or be returned to stand trial for the offense charged. D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-504 to -514 (1961).
8 Ibid. This idea seems to be implied in the statute. Cf. Easter v. District
of Columbia, 34 U.S.L. Week 2534 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1966).
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independent evaluating function for the judge or jury." Medical
testimony, subject to cross-examination, could be introduced by
either side in the proceedings. Thus, the determination would not
be for the police on arraignment or for the doctors in a rehabilita-
tion center.
If a person is deemed a chronic alcoholic and cannot be con-
victed for violating a public drunkenness statute, the problem arises
what the state can do with him to protect him and the public. In
the Robinson decision the Court speaking of narcotics addicts said:
In the interest of discouraging the violation of such laws, or
in the interest of the general health or welfare of its inhabitants,
a State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for
those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of treatment might
require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal sanction
might be imposed for failure to comply with established com-
pulsory treatment procedures.35
In the Driver case the court said, "'[N]othing we have said pre-
cludes appropriate detention of him for treatment and rehabilitation
so long as he is not marked a criminal.' -a It would seem to follow
that a state could commit a chronic alcoholic to a rehabilitation cen-
ter but could not call him a criminal. This could be accomplished
by means of a civil commitment statute such as is found in North
Carolina.3 7 But, before a state enters upon any program to provide
for chronic alcoholics, the courts must make it clear what type of
confinement would be permitted. THOMAS SIDNEY SMITH
", In a criminal case where the defendant interposes the defense of
intoxication the normal rule is that he has the burden of proof to that fact
and the ultimate issue is for the jury to decide. E.g., State v. Tansimore,
3 N.J. 516, 71 A.2d 169 (1950). Since the court considers chronic alcohol-
ism a disease, it would seem to follow that the rules governing the proof of
insanity could possibly apply to chronic alcoholism. In a trial during which
insanity is brought into issue the burden of proof of insanity is on the
party alleging it. E.g., Handspike v. State, 203 Ga. 115, 45 S.E.2d 662
(1947) ; State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949). If the party
asserts insanity that was only temporary, the burden is on him to prove
that he was insane at the time alleged. E.g., Barbour v. State, 262 Ala. 297,
78 So. 2d 328 (1954); State v. Shackleford, 232 N.C. 299, 59 S.E.2d 825
(1950). The existence of insanity is a question to be decided by the jury.
E.g., Wilson v. State, 9 Ga. App. 274, 70 S.E. 1128 (1911) ; State v. Creech,
229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949); State v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28
S.E.2d 232 (1943). See generally 44 C.J.S. Insanity § 7 (1945). For an
excellent bibliography on insanity and the criminal law see TOMPKINS, IN-
SANITY AND TEE CRIMINAL LAW (1960).
" Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962).
s 34 U.S.L. Week at 2422.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1965).
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